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ROBERT A. HOLDERBY, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS,
LOCAL UNION NO. 12 (an Unincorporated Associaet
Appellants.
[1] Associations-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent.
-Generally, a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an
organization of which he is a member must first invoke and
exhaust the remedies provided by that organization applicable
to his grievance.
[2] !d.-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent.-It is only
when an organization violates its rules for appellate review
or on a showing that it would be futile to invoke them that
further pursuit of internal relief is excused; the violation of
its own rules which inflicts the initial wrong furnishes no
right for direct resort to the courts.
[3] !d.-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent.-Violation
of other laws and wrongs done within an organization are
intended to be conciliated and corrected by the appellate
machinery provided therein if properly invoked by an aggrieved party and applied by the organization, and if recourse
to such appellate machinery is not sought an aggrieved party
foregoes his right to a judicial review regardless of the breach
of its own rules by the organization in causing the grievance
in the first instance.
[ 4] Labor-Remedies-Conditions Precedent.-When an internal
appeal is open to a member of a union, after its executive
board has denied him reinstatement as a member in good
standing, he has no right to invoke the aid of the courts where
he has made no attempt to obtain such appeal and there is
nothing to indicate that an appeal would not have been accorded him in which to seek redress for the alleged wrongs.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed.
Action seeking reinstatement in a union as a member in
good standing, and for damages resulting from unlawful
exclusion. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Associations and Clubs, §§ 16, 25; Am.Jur.,
Associations and Clubs, § 17 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Associations,§ 12; [4] Labor,§ 24.
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J.-This is an appeal
the defendant Local
Union Number 12 of the International Union of Operating
from a
for the plaintiff Robert A.
Holderby in an action in which the plaintiff sought and obtained reinstatement as a member in good standing in the
union and damages resulting from his alleged unlawful ex·
elusion therefrom.
The plaintiff became a member of the union in October,
1952. From November, 1952, until March, 1953, he was
delinquent in his dues and for that reason was suspended
from membership by the executive board of the union on
February 5, 1953. Thereafter he applied for reinstatement
and assigned illness as the reason for his delinquency. On
March 17, 1953, the executive board addressed a letter to
him stating the conditions of his reinstatement as follows:
". . . it was the recommendation of the Advisory Board,
concurred in by the Executive Board, that you be granted
the privilege of Reinstating your membership by the payment of back Per Capita tax, Reinstatement Fee of $5.00,
dues for the current month, and three months dues in advance." The executive board waived certain of the above
items and gave a credit for $10 paid prior to March 17. It
stated in its letter that there remained a balance of $19
due and that in addition it required the plaintiff to furnish
a doctor's certificate substantiating his illness. It appears
that the requirements for reinstatement were consistent with
the union's constitution. On April 29 a report certifying
that the plaintiff had been a patient at a veterans' hospital
was mailed to the financial secretary of the union. On May
27 the plaintiff made final payment of the amount required
for reinstatement pins dues to that date. Soon thereafter
he was issued a referral slip for a work assignment on which
the notation "dues paid rein 12" appeared. It may be assumed that the notation was in recognition of the payment
of dues and the plaintiff's reinstatement in Local 12.
On June 6, 1953, the executive board of the union met
and purported to reject the plaintiff's application for reinstatement. The minutes of its meeting state that "A motion
was made, seconded and carried that all previous action of
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the Executive Board in the case of Robert A.
be
rescinded. A motion was made and seconded that the application for reinstatement of Robert A.
be rejected and that all moneys
the Local Union by him
be refunded. On the motion it vvas
established
that
was not a
and that his
the past six months had marked him as an
individual undesirable for
in this Union." The
plaintiff received a letter from the union advising him of
his rejection and enclosing a check for
as ''the total
amount paid in by you on Initiation
Permits, etc."
On July 1, 1953, the
commenced the present
action. Article XVII, section 1
of the union's constitution provides in part as follows : ''Any General Officer who
shall have filed in a Local Union
a member
thereof, and any officer or member of a Local Union, may
appeal to the General Executive Board from the adoption
of any action by said Local
or from any decision rendered by the General President.
Local
or member thereof which belongs to a
State or Provincial
Organization or Joint Executive Board may appeal to the
General Executive Board from any act or decision of said
local, State or Provincial Organization or Joint Executive
Board. . . . " Section 3 of that article states: "No suit or
other action at law or equity shall be
in any court
by any member, officer or subdivision of the International
Union of Operating Engineers until and unless all rights,
remedies and provisions for hearing, trial and appeal within
the Organization shall have been properly followed and exhausted by the member, officer or subdivision complaining.
. . . '' Prior to commencing this action the plaintiff did not
avail himself of the remedies
in the constitution
for a review by the general executive board of the action
taken against him.
The plaintiff claims that on May 27, after he had fully
complied with the requirements on which his reinstatement
was conditioned, he automatically became fully reinstated
to membership in the union; that thereafter the purported
denial of his application for reinstatement was in realty an
exclusion from membership without compliance with procedures established in the union's constitution, and that he
was improperly deprived of valuable rights conferred upon
him as a member of the union. (See Lawson v. Hewell, 118
Cal. 613 [50 P. 763, 49 L.R.A. 400].) There is no question
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but that provisions in the union constitution for the expulsion
of members were not follo,ved. That document requires that
formal charges be filed and a hearing be had.
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, specifically finding that ''in accordance with the said letter of March 17,
1953, the reinstatement of the plaintiff had been completed
by May 28, 1953'' ; that he was a member in good standing
on June 6, 1953, the date the alleged exclusionary action
took place; that "he was entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership at the said time," and that, "by reason
of said action on the part of the Executive Board, plaintiff
was thereby in effect, expelled from the defendant Local
Union No. 12. . . . ''
The foregoing findings of the court are supported by substantial evidence, and on appeal may not be successfully
controverted by the defendant. However, it is contended
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust the remedies available
within the union and that he is not now entitled to judicial
relief.
[1] It is the general and well established jurisdictional
rule that a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an
organization of which he is a member must first invoke and
exhaust the remedies provided by that organization applicable to his grievance. (Lawson v. Hewell, supra, 118 Cal.
613; Levy v. Magnolia Lodge No. 29, I.O.O.F., 110 Cal.
297 [42 P. 887] .) This rule is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition
precedent to resorting to the courts (see 2 Cal.Jur.2d 304),
and to the rule requiring the parties to a contract for arbitration of disputes to exhaust those remedies before seeking
judicial relief. (See Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.App.2d
558 [277 P.2d 464], and cases collected at p. 563.) Such
rules are based on a practical approach to the solution of
internal problems, complaints and grievances that arise between parties functioning pursuant to special and complex
agreements or other arrangements. They make possible the
settlement of such matters by simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedures, and by persons who, generally, are
familiar therewith. Such internal remedies are designed not
only to promote the settlement of grievances but also to promote more harmonious relationships, and the courts look with
favor upon them.
The plaintiff claims that an exception to the general rule
made it unnecessary that he pursue the internal remedies
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for review before commencing this action. In W tiber v.
1l1arine Cooks' &: Stewards' Assn., 93 Cal.App.2d 327 [208
P.2d 1009), it is stated at page 338 that "where an organization has violated its own laws and arbitrarily violated a
member's property rights the rule of exhaustion of remedies
to a higher body within the organization need not
be adhered to before direct resort to a judicial tribunal.''
(See Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks & Stewards, 98 Cal.
App.2d 733 at 736 [221 P.2d 136].) If such an exception
is construed as broadly as the quoted language would permit,
it· would make it unnecessary for any party with a justified
grievance involving personal and property rights against an
organization of which he is a member, including the plaintiff
in the present case, to have the matter corrected internally by
the machinery provided before resorting to the courts. The
exception in such a case would swallow the rule, a result
clearly not intended by the cases relied on as authority for
the broad interpretation sought by the plaintiff to justify
this action. [2] It is only when the organization violates
its rules for appellate review or upon a showing that it would
be futile to invoke them that the further pursuit of internal
relief is excused. The violation of its own rules which inflicts
the initial wrong furnishes no right for direct resort to the
courts.
The statement of the exception in the Weber case, discussed
only incidentally with other points considered determinative,
is said to have resulted from a holding in Simpson v. Sa~vation
Army, 49 CaLA.pp.2d 371 [121 P.2d 847]. In that ease the
court set forth the exception in almost identical language,
with citations, and then stated at page 375: "Obviously, that
exception is not here involved.'' In one of the two cases
there relied on (N eto v. Conselho Amor Da Sociedade, 18 Cal.
App. 234 [122 P. 973]) the court stated the exception, citing
the other case as authority therefor, but refused to apply
the exception. Thus the authority for the quoted language
is easily traced to that other case, Sckou v. Sotoyome Tribe,
No. 12 (1903), 140 Cal. 254 [73 P. 996]. The holding in
that case, however, does not justify the interpretation the
plaintiff in the present case would place upon it. There
relief was sought by the plaintiff Mrs. Schou in behalf of her
husband, a member of the Sotoyome Tribe of the Improved
Order of Redmen of California, a fraternal and benevolent
organization. His application for sick benefits was refused
on the ground that the affliction for which he sought relief
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constitution of the organifeel
at the
pay benefits that may be
such person must appeal from such action
thereof within 20 suns after said
sachem shall without delay appoint
order
a commissioner to take such
offer in relation to the case.''
denial of his application, Mrs.
made
but unavailing
efforts to obtain information of the tribe's decision. The
opinion then relates that ''Thereafter she was informed by
the tribe that 'she would have to take the case before the
great sachem.' In response to this, her attorneys wrote to
the great sachem
him for information as to the proper
procedure, aud were by the great sachem informed simply
that he had uo
in the matter. Finally, Mrs.
Schou's
gave the tribe notice of an appeal 'to the
great sachem and
council,' and sent an appeal to the
great council, but, so far as she or her attorneys were advised,
neither the tribe nor the great council paid any attention
to these
No commissioner was appointed to take
evidence, no 'ten suns' notice, nor any notice at all, was
given, nor was
nor Mrs. Schou upon his behalf, ever
allowed to present any evidence. In this condition of affairs,
not knowing whether or not she was to be allowed to prosecute
her appeal, or if it would be entertained by the great council
of the
and
had no opportunity at all to present
her evidence as to Sc1JOu 's right to the sick benefits" she
resorted to court action.
The foregoing account of Mrs. Schou's inability to obtain
an appeal within the machinery provided, although she herself complied with all
made known to her, caused
the court to conclude it to be "perfectly clear" that she
"was relieved from furtlJer compliance, or attempt at compliance, with the regulations and procedure of the order
touching appeals. . . . Before an order can hold a member
to strict observance of its rules regulating procedure on
appeal it must show that in all matters touching his substantial rights it has itself observed these regulations, and
this the defendant did not do. Its dereliction in this regard
excuses a claimant from exhausting his remedy within the
rules of the order.''
It is apparent from the foregoing that the court in the
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Schou case excused the
's further attempt at compliance wtih internal rules of appeal because the organization
itself arbitrarily refused to comply with and be governed by
those same internal rules of appeal and for all practical purposes it became impossible for the plaintiff to obtain a review
of the
action claimed to be improper. Accordingly, the
statement in the \Veber case
to an exception to the
rule ''where an organization has violated its own
laws," can have reference only to its rules on appeal, the
violation of which in effect prevented an aggrieved party from
seeking redress thereunder. [3] A violation of other laws
and wrongs done within the organization are intended to be
conciliated and corrected by the appellate machinery provided
therein, if properly invoked by an aggrieved party and applied
by the organization. If recourse to such appellate machinery
is not sought an aggrieved party foregoes his right to a judicial
review regardless of the breach of its own rules by the organization in causing the grievance in the first instance. If the
organization fails to apply its appellate machinery after it is
properly invoked and in effect prevents an appeal from being
taken, the aggrieved party, under the Schou case, need not
pursue such an appeal further. Any implications in the
statement of the exception to the general rule in the cases
heretofore cited are accordingly limited.
[4] In the present case the plaintiff made no attempt
to obtain an internal appeal, and there is nothing to indicate
that an appeal would not have been accorded him in which
to seek redress for the alleged wrongs. He falls squarely
within the rule that when an internal appeal is open to him
he has no right to invoke the aid of the courts.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-1 dissent.
The majority in this case holds that a member of a union
cannot obtain relief in the courts when he has been t>xpelled
without the notice or hearing required by the union's constitution and by-laws because he did not appeal the expulsion to
a higher authority in the union which he had the right to do
under the circumstances. This exhaustion of remedies within
the union is the universal rule on the subject but there are
\'xceptions to it, one of which is that it does not apply where
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the union has violated its own law with
to
The majority states that there is no reason for the exception,
and that to apply it completely wipes out the rule, and
mentions some of the cases upholding the exception, and, in
effect, disapproves them, but it does not do so expressly. It
has been held in this state that where the union or other
unincorporated association fails to give notice and hearing for
an expulsion, the member need not exhaust a remedy by appeal
under the constitution of the association. (Swital v. Real
Estate Comr., 116 Cal.App.2d 677 [254 P.2d 587] ; Ell'is v.
American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120 P.2d
79]; Stoica v. International etc. Emp., 78 Cal.App.2d 533 [178
P.2d 21]; Weber v. Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Assn., 93 Cal.
App.2d 327 [208 P.2d 1009]; Smetherham v. La~tndry Workers' Uni011, 44 Cal.App.2d 131 [111 P.2d 948].) The exception
is nearly universally recognized. It is said in 168 A.L.R.
1462, 1468, citiug cases from California, Georgia, Indiana,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania and the federal courts: ""Where the provisions
of the constitution and the bylaws as to suspension or expulsion are not complied with, as where no notice or hearing
is given to the member, no written charges are preferred
against him as required by the constitution and the bylaws,
or where the decision for expulsion is contrary to the constitution and bylaws of the union, or the offense with which the
member is charged is not a ground for expulsion, or where
the expulsion or suspension is void for lack of authority or
jurisdiction in the body or person conducting the trial or
rendering the decision for suspension or expulsion, or is
otherwise irregular, the requirement that the internal remedies
within the union mnst first be exhausted will not be insisted
upon as a condition to grant of equitable relief for reinstatement, as in all these cases the action of expulsion or suspension
is not the authorized action of the union, and the member's
duty to exhaust first the internal remedies within the union
is generally understood as contemplating an action of the
union which is authorized under its constitution and the bylaws. In other words, the rule as to exhaustion of internal
remedies pre-supposes a legal and regular proceeding for
suspension or expulsion.'' (See also 20 A.I.J.R.2d 531. 565 ;
id., 344, 386; 4 Am.Jur., Associations & Clubs, § 31.) There
should be given a definitive reason why those authorities are
wrong. Moreover the plaintiff-exnelled member-sought
da~ as well as reinstatement.
The appellate body in
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the union has
and inasmuch
as it is clear that
was illegally expelled, it would
appear that his right to damages would not be affected by his
failure to
In a case like the one here an appeal would be an idle act
and thus unnecessary, for the majority states: "There is no
question but that the provisions in the union's constitution for
the expulsion of members were not followed. That document
requires that formal charges be filed and a hearing be had.''
That being true the appellate body could do nothing else
but reverse the expulsion; if it did not a court would do so.
In effect the appeal could serve no useful function.
Finally, it should be remembered that the constitution and
by-laws of the union constitute a contract between the members and the association and one of the reasons for the rule
that an expelled member must pursue his remedy within the
association before resorting to the courts is that the contract
requires him to do so. However, where the member has been
expelled in violation of that contract the association has
repudiated it and it is no longer binding on the member. A
breach of contract or a refusal to perform by one of the parties
excuses the other party, not at fault, from performance on
his part. (Twomey v. People's Ice Co., 66 Cal. 233 [5 P. 158];
Gold Min. & Water Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Cal.2d 19 [142 P.2d
22] ; Central Oil Co. v. Southern Refining Co., 154 Cal. 165 [97
P. 177].) Hence in this case plaintiff was excused from performance of the contract requiring an appeal to a higher
authority in the union because of the union's repudiation and
violation of the contract requiring a notice and hearing.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.

